

Message Text

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USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6258

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: PUBLIC PRESENTATION PAPER

REF: USNATO 6184 DTG 131800Z NOV 75

1. IN VIEW OF THE BROAD SUPPORT IN SPC FOR THE DUTCH APPROACH
AS THE BASIS FOR THE ALLIED PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION II
I

(REFTEL, WE ARE TRANSMITTING IN THIS MESSAGE THE FULL DUTCH TEXT.
OUR REPORT OF SOME OF THE LATER AMENDMENTS WILL BE KEYED TO
THIS TEXT.

2. BEGIN DUTCH TEXT

MBFR: PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

I. GENERAL REMARKS

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1. ALLIED OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN COULD NOT USE THE CONTENTS OF THIS
PAPER EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. THE ALLIES SHOULD
SEEK, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, TO KEEP DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIV
E

CONFIDENTIAL. STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE, OR REGARDING THE DETAILS OF DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST, WOULD VIOLATE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE EAST REGARDING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY COULD ALSO BE CONTRARY TO ALLIED INTEREST IN THAT THEY MIGHT PROVOKE PUBLIC COUNTER-REACTIONS FROM THE EAST, RESULTING IN A POSSIBLE HARDENING OF POSITION, A DELAY IN THE CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE WHICH THE ALLIES SEEK, AND A DIMINUTION OF THE CHANCES THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING, SERIOUS PRESS LEAKS REGARDING THE CONTENT OF CURRENT INTERNAL ALLIED DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED AND MAY CONTINUE. FROM WHAT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE WESTERN PRESS, INTERESTED OBSERVERS ARE ALREADY IN A POSITION TO PIECE TOGETHER A REASONABLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE FORTHCOMING ALLIED PROPOSAL. ONCE THE ALLIED PROPOSAL IS PUT FORWARD IN VIENNA, PRESS INTEREST WILL INCREASE, AND IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY. IN THIS SITUATION, ALLIED OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE PRESS MAY BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN A "NO COMMENT" POSTURE.

3. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF PRESS INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIENNA, AS IT HAS BEEN HERETOFORE. WORKING WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER, THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP, AS NEEDED, APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR ITS SPOKESMEN. ALLIED SPOKESMEN IN BRUSSELS AND IN CAPITALS WILL ALSO NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH PRESS ENQUIRIES. NOTWITHSTANDING, THE ALLIES DO NOT NOW DESIRE TO ENTER INTO A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH THE EAST ON MBFR PROPOSALS OR PRESENT A NATO WHITE PAPER ON THE ALLIED POSITION, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE. THEREFORE, ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THIS GUIDANCE UNTIL THE AD HOC GROUP HAS JUDGED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DO SO, THE TIMING IS CORRECT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS WILL NOT PREJUDICE A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE; AND UNTIL THE
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COUNCIL HAS CONFIRMED THE JUDGEMENT OF THE AD HOC GROUP. IF THE AD HOC GROUP IS NOT IN SESSION THE COUNCIL ALONE WILL MAKE THIS JUDGEMENT.

II. ELEMENTS OF A PRESS STATEMENT

WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF SECTION I ABOVE, ALLIED SPOKESMEN MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE:

(A) THE PRIMARY ALLIED OBJECTIVE AS TO THE OUTCOME OF MBFR CONTINUES TO BE THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO BE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. THIS

DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES IS THE MOST DESTABILISING FEATURE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; ITS REDUCTION WOULD LESSEN THE RISK OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, IN EUROPE.

(B) THE ALLIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MUST BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY.

(C) AFTER EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR, THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. THIS PROPOSAL INVOLVES THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS FROM EUROPE, INCLUDING SOME US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, SOME US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT, AND SOME US SURFACE-T O-SURFACE PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

(C) THIS INITIATIVE IS A NONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH PREVIOUS ALLIED PROPOSALS, IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCERNS THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

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(E) IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THESE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE ALLIED OFFER IS A WEIGHTY ONE. THE ALLIES ARE CONFIDENT THAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE WILL NOT BE OVERLOOKED BY THE EAST IF THE EAST IS TRULY INTERESTED IN PURSUING PRACTICAL MEASURES OF DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IN EUROPE AND IS INTERESTED IN REACHING A SUBSTANTIAL AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF WAR IN EUROPE.

(F) THE ALLIES EXPECT THE EAST TO MAKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE AND TO AGREE TO ADDRESS ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

III. CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS FOR USE WITH PUBLIC

WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF SECTION I ABOVE, ALLIED SPOKESMEN ARE AUTHORISED TO DRAW, AS NECESSARY, ON THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC AND IN GIVING BACKGROUND TALKS. IF QUESTIONS ARE RAISED IN THE PRESS AND IN THE
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MIND OF THE PUBLIC OVER THE IMPLICATION FOR ALLIED SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR PROPOSAL, THEY SHOULD TRY TO DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS IN A POSITIVE MANNER. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LOW KEY IN NATURE, SO AS TO AVOID EXTENSIVE PUBLIC COMMENT OR DEBATE.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ARRANGED UNDER NINE MAJOR POINTS:

(G) PURPOSE OF NUCLEAR PROPOSAL:

-THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT ON A BALANCED, AND THEREFORE MORE STABLE, MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

-NATO REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTOR FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE MAINTAINS ITS VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BRING ABOUT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, WHILE PROVIDING FOR A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

-THIS-AND THIS ONLY-IS THE PURPOSE OF THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE EAST FROM THE VERY BEGINNING PROPOSED A PROPORTIONATE ACROSS-THE-BOARD-REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY. THE ALLIES CONSIDER SUCH AN APPROACH UNACCEPTABLE.

-THE ALLIED INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR

OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS ONE-TIME OFFER, AND AS FAR AS IT GOES, THE WEST DOES, HOWEVER, TAKE THE EASTERN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT.

(H) INCENTIVE NATURE OF OFFER:

THE ALLIANCE PURSUES ITS ORIGINAL AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT THROUGH MBFR A BALANCED GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE NUCLEAR OFFER SERVES AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE JUST THIS. THUS THE ALLIANCE DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF GENERALLY INCLUDING
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NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. RATHER, THE ALLIED NUCLEAR OFFER IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN OTHER WORDS, IT SHOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW FOR THE EAST TO BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH REFUSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY.

(I) EXCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS:

A REDUCTION OF NON-US ALLIED NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE INCLUSION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS OR ON EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

(J) LIMITS OF OFFER:

THE NEW ALLIED PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC AND SOUND, IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECTS ON ALLIANCE SECURITY. IT IS THE JUDGEMENT OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW ON SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS THE OUTCOME OF MBFR, THE PROPOSED ALLIED REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT DIMINISH NATO SECURITY. AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE MAKES POSSIBLE A REDUCTION OF SOME US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETERRENT AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK, THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA. IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. FURTHER MORE, EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENCE WILL NOT BE CHANGED.

(K) CONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR SHARING:

WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE

PARTICIPATION OF THE US'S EUROPEAN ALLIES IN NUCLEAR
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DEFENCE-SOMETIMES CALLED "NUCLEAR SHARING"- WILL REMAIN
AS IT IS. THE NON-US NUCLEAR UNITS WIL FULLY MAINTAIN THEIR
PRESENT FUNCTION AND EFFECTIVENESS.

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(L) CONTINUTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE:
IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR
ELEMENTS TAKE PLANCE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE
MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED
NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY, CONSISTING
OF THE TRIAD OF NATO DEFENCE-CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL-NUCLEAR
AND STRATEGIC- WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED
DEFENCE ARRANGMENTS IN EUROPE.

(M) ABSENCE OF ANY "STRATEGIC DECOUPLING":

THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN
EUROPE REMAINS FIRM AND UNCHANGED. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN IN EUROPE LARGE AND HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES, BOTH
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR. THIS LARGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
DEMONSTRATES US RESOLVE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE
DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA. MOREOVER, THIS COMMITMENT IS BACKED

BY LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT CAN REINFORCE EUROPE,
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AND ULTIMATELY BY THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT. THEREFORE,
THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WILL NOT LEAD
TO A "DECOUPLING" OF THE ESCALATORY CONNECTION OF NATO'S
DETERRENCE, NOW WIL IT AFFECT THE NATO "TRIAD" OF DEFENCE.

(N) CONTINUED TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET IR/MRBM'S:

THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING OFFER DOES NOT PUT INTO QUESTION THE
PRESENT COVERAGE OF THOSE SOVIET IR/MRBM'S WHICH ARE
TARGETED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE.

(O) REASONS FOR LACK OF FULL RECIPROCITY:

-REPEAT ANSWER (A) ABOVE.

-TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NATO'S OBJECTIVE IN PROPOSING TO REDUCE
CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE REDUCTIONS
WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE WILL BE DIFFERENT IN SOME RESPECTS ON
EACH SIDE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE WEST IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED
WITH THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY
IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS, AND SEEKS AN AGREEMENT
THAT WOULD RESULT IN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND
A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

-ONE MAY ADD THAT MBFR AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
REDUCE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION.
BY THE SAME TOKEN, NATO DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE THE
AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE REDUCED EITHER.
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